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Abstract
In recent years, a growing number of studies have researchers opting to use real
e¤ort designs for laboratory experiments where subjects complete an actual task to
exert e¤ort rather than using what is perhaps a more traditional design of stylized
e¤ort where subjects simply choose an e¤ort level from a pre-dened set. The commonly
argued reason for real e¤ort is that it makes the results more generalizable and eld
relevant. Some researchers go further and make a distinction between trivial and useful
real e¤ort, i.e. whether the task is only relevant for the experiment or if it leads to
tangible production for some purpose outside of the experiment, and claim that the
useful e¤ort model is even more likely to be generalizable. We present an experiment
designed to test whether these three modes of e¤ort, stylized, trivial, and useful, have
any impact on behavior in a public goods setting. We nd that all three forms of e¤ort
lead to identical decision making and then discuss how these results help to inform us
about the use of real e¤ort in laboratory experiments.
JEL Codes: C91, H41Key Words: Real E¤ort, Stylized E¤ort, Abstract E¤ort,
Economics Experiments, Public Goods
1 Introduction
There are many di¤erent forms of economic experiments in which researchers want exper-
imental subjects to engage in tasks modeled after eld tasks that involve expenditures of
e¤ort. This includes principal-agent games or other workplace related decision making en-
vironments in which a researcher wants to understand how di¤erent incentive structures or
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environmental features a¤ect e¤ort decisions. It also includes many other standard envi-
ronments such as coordination games, trust games, and public goods games. This makes
the manner in which e¤ort is modeled of key importance to the design of a very wide range
of experiments.
Traditionally there are two di¤erent ways that one might consider modeling e¤ort. We
will refer to the rst as real e¤ortwhere subjects perform a task that involves some degree
of actual e¤ort and the second as stylized e¤ortwhere a subject chooses some e¤ort level
from a given set of alternatives. The stylized e¤ort design is essentially an analog of the
structure found in theoretical models involving e¤ort choice. In the stylized e¤ort approach
one might allow a subject to choose e¤ort on the range of [0; 10] with higher numbers
resulting in a higher cost to the subject than lower numbers. The function dening the cost
of any level of e¤ort is therefore induced and under the control of the experimenter. This
induced cost function is intended to capture the important aspects of actual physical and
mental exertion in which a person chooses how much e¤ort to exert and higher e¤ort levels
are assumed to involve higher mental or physical costs.
In a real e¤ort design, the experimenter will have the subjects complete a task such as
solving math problems which require actual physical or mental exertion. In these situations,
a researcher assumes that there is some cost to the subject of completing the task but
the nature of the cost function is unknown and typically not under the control of the
experimenter.1 To the extent that the induced cost function in a stylized e¤ort design
captures the cost function in the real e¤ort task, one would expect similar behavior in the
two environments. If, however, an induced cost function is not a good match with the cost
function in the real e¤ort task, then one should not expect comparable results. Also, if
the cost function in the real e¤ort task does not match the one assumed in a theoretical
model of behavior, one should also not expect the behavior in the real e¤ort task to match
with the theoretical predictions. These points regarding the importance of matching cost
functions across contexts are important and yet are commonly ignored in the literature on
real e¤ort experiments. They will be a central issue in what we discuss in the current study.
Early experiments that involved subjects engaging in e¤ort were mostly done using the
stylized e¤ort design (extensive examples can be found in various literature reviews such as
Kuhn and Charness (2011) for labor experiments, Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for
public goods, Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for coordination games, and Johnson and Mislin
(2011) for trust games). Recently there has been a substantial shift towards experimenters
preferring real e¤ort designs. In attempting to understand the issues behind why one would
choose one model or the other, we will rst review some of the advantages and disadvantages
claimed in the literature for the di¤erent ways of modeling e¤ort in the lab.
The stylized e¤ort approach has one clear advantage in its favor: control. By using the
stylized e¤ort approach one can establish a very tight connection between the experimental
set-up and the underlying theory. For example, in a theoretical model of a principal-
agent game, the agent is modeled as choosing an e¤ort level and facing a cost function
which translates the e¤ort choice into a monetary equivalent cost. The stylized e¤ort
implementation in the lab is identical. This allows an experimenter precise control over the
1Gächter, Huang, and Sefton (2015) develop a task that combines real e¤ort with controlled costs in such
a way that they claim to achieve the benets of both design approaches. Their results show that similar
results are achieved between this task and stylized e¤ort designs.
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cost of a subjects e¤ort which also allows for the ability to manipulate that cost function
as needed. Ultimately this allows for the specication and testing of precise hypotheses
regarding behavior. This tight connection with the theory also helps to develop a clear
understanding for when and perhaps why individual behavior di¤ers from those theoretical
predictions. Another advantage of this approach is that the time commitment involved in
these experiments is typically less than in real e¤ort experiments which allows the researcher
greater exibility in the topics which can be covered in a typical experiment.
When moving to a real e¤ort design, the cost function is uncontrolled by the exper-
imenter. This loss of control leads to a diminished connection to theory. Consequently,
one can often not make precise predictions regarding behavior which makes it more di¢ -
cult to identify deviations from theoretical predictions and determine their nature. There
are, however, claims about advantages from the real e¤ort approach which explain why
people use it. A good example of the claimed advantage is found in Kuhn and Charness
(2011),Concerning the objection that the labor task is abstract and articial, there has
been an increasing trend in real-e¤ortexperiments....The claim here is that the increase
in the use of real e¤ort designs is due to the fact that they help make the experiments less
abstract and articial. Similarly Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden (2001) state that
real e¤ort involves e¤ort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other a¤ectations not present
in the abstract experiments.Their conjecture is that subjects would be willing to work for
more hours than if they give the equivalent amount of money to a charity - a conjecture
which was supported in Brown, Meer, and Williams (2013). Corgnet, Hernán-González,
and Rassenti (2011) further argue that a real e¤ort design helps overcome a problem with
laboratory experiments claimed by Falk and Heckman (2009) which is that There is also
a widespread view that the lab produces unrealistic data, which lacks relevance for under-
standing the real world. This view is crystallized in Gill and Prowse (2011) when the
authors state that The main advantage of using a real e¤ort task over a monetary cost
function is the greater external validity of the experiment, which increases with how closely
exerting e¤ort in the task replicates the exertion of e¤ort outside of the laboratory.While
other studies using real e¤ort designs dont always state this argument so explicitly, they
usually make the same claim or a similar one implicitly which is that somehow the real
e¤ort specication is a better match with the eld. One noticeable failing in most of these
studies, though, is the failure to provide a clear argument for why this would be the case
or to provide empirical validation for the claim. Both are important points to establish in
order to better understand the issue of how to best model e¤ort in an experiment.
As an attempt to establish those points, we can start by trying to understand the logical
arguments for why real e¤ort designs might be more externally valid. One argument for
why a specic task in an experiment would generalize to the eld would be that the cost
function of that task shares important characteristics with the eld task and these costs
cannot be captured in a more controlled setting. To make such a claim one would have to
put forward the argument that the cost function of the lab task, e.g. aligning sliders, has
the same characteristics of the cost functions in the eld tasks such as mail room workers
sorting packages, lawyers taking a case to trial or doctors diagnosing patients. This does
not appear to be the argument advanced in many papers in the literature possibly because
it would be di¢ cult to support. For example, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003)
study gender di¤erences in competitive environments where subjects solve mazes. There is
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no discussion of what task in the eld has a cost function that is well captured by solving
mazes. Charness and Villeval (2009) also use a real e¤ort task of completing anagrams
to examine how age inuences competitive preferences and again it isnt made clear what
eld competitive environment has the same e¤ort cost function as constructing anagrams.
Johnson and Salmon (2016) have subjects solve math problems to represent workplace
promotion tournaments but do not provide any argument for why the cost function for
solving math problems is a good proxy for that of any specic workplace behavior. While
these real e¤ort tasks all involve physical or mental exertion they are also still quite abstract
in terms of how they represent the corresponding eld situations. These papers are no
di¤erent than others on this issue and the point is simply that while this seems to be the
most obvious way one might support the external validity claim, few seem to use it as their
rationale.
An alternative argument is that real e¤ort tasks, by their nature of involving actual
mental or physical exertion, are able to trigger certain types of behavior that a stylized
design would not be able to. In Ku and Salmon (2012), the authors argue that the reason
for choosing real e¤ort over a stylized e¤ort design is due to the belief that subjects might
form more of an emotional connection to their e¤ort choices if they represent real e¤ort
than if they are simply chosen from a number line. In Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000), subjects
crack walnuts to earn their endowment in a trust game because they wanted the working
task to make the workers su¤er to a certain extent in order to guarantee that they really
felt entitled to the property rights. Again, these are just examples of a common theme
found in the literature and while there is certainly intuitive logic to these claims, they are
typically just asserted and are not tested.
Some researchers who are concerned about the abstract nature of even these real e¤ort
designs go even further and argue that there should be a distinction between what we will
refer to as trivialversus useful real e¤ort. Trivial real e¤ort would be an experiment
design in which the e¤ort from the subjects is relevant only for the internal purposes of the
experiment. Aligning sliders or solving math problems and mazes would all be examples of
trivial e¤ort as these tasks have no relevance outside of the laboratory. To circumvent this
issue, other real e¤ort tasks involve having subjects do things like stu¤ envelopes that will
be used for o¢ cial department business (Carpenter, Liati, and Vickery (2010)) or cracking
nuts that are used in a grocery stores holiday cookies (Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000)). This
e¤ort is useful since the subjects are engaging in tasks that yield tangible output which
is relevant outside of the laboratory. In these experiments, subjects are almost employees
and so they could see it as a close analog to an actual job. This useful e¤ort approach to
modeling e¤ort in the lab is a very small step from a eld experiment and some argue that
it is the best way to model e¤ort in the lab. An important caveat is that if one claims that
the only way to generalize to the eld is to match the tasks precisely then this implicitly
involves a claim that envelope stu¢ ng experiments only apply to very similar settings in the
eld in which people engage in simple repetitive and menial o¢ ce tasks. Thus this argument
can actually be seen as an argument for limits on the generalizability of experiments to the
eld rather than arguing that experiments based on subjects shelling nuts generalize to a
broader set of eld situations.
We have demonstrated that while many prior studies advance claims regarding the
di¤erent approaches to modeling e¤ort in an experiment, the validity of those claims has
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not been rmly established. In order to validate these claims, two empirical points must be
established:
1. The type of e¤ort in an experiment design has a direct e¤ect on the behavior of
subjects.
2. If the behavior in real e¤ort is di¤erent than stylized e¤ort, then the behavior gener-
ated by the real e¤ort designs does a better job of matching with observed behavior
in related eld contexts.
The second point is perhaps the more important one but before investigating it, it is
necessary to establish the validity of the rst. There have been a few prior studies which
have begun to address the rst point but they have not been able to provide conclusive
answers. Bortolotti, Devetag, and Ortmann (2009) examine a weak link game with real
e¤ort and nd results quite di¤erent from many stylized e¤ort experiments suggesting that
indeed real and stylized e¤ort yield di¤erent behaviors. However, the real e¤ort task they
use has a cost function with unknown properties which is unlikely to match the properties of
the induced cost function for the stylized e¤ort treatment. Consequently it isnt clear if the
di¤erences are due to the type of e¤ort or due to di¤erences in the cost functions. Brüggen
and Strobel (2007) examine the issue in the context of gift exchange games and nd no
di¤erence, but again the cost functions between the two environments are uncontrolled so
whether there should be di¤erences is unclear. Lezzi, Fleming, and Zizzo (2015) compare
three di¤erent real e¤ort tasks with an induced e¤ort version and nd substantial di¤erences
in how people respond to them. This is perhaps similar to results found in Dutcher (2012)
where di¤erent results were obtained between two di¤erent real e¤ort tasks in which one
required creative thinking while the other did not. One might conclude that these studies
provide conclusive evidence that real e¤ort changes behavior since behavior changes across
real e¤ort tasks. That would only be a valid conclusion if the cost of e¤ort functions
between these tasks were identical. There seems little reason to believe that they were
and so a better interpretation of those results is that they conrm our point made above
regarding how di¤erent cost functions yield di¤erent results.
This now allows us to state very clearly the question that will be the subject of our
study: is there a di¤erence in behavior between real e¤ort and stylized e¤ort experiments
which can be attributed purely to the di¤erence in the manner in which e¤ort is modeled?
We have chosen to investigate this question in the context of public goods games. There
are multiple reasons why the public goods game is a useful context in which to test this
issue. First, the stylized facts of public goods games with chosen e¤ort have been replicated
numerous times in the literature and are well known, see again Ledyard (1995) and Chaud-
huri (2011). Thus we have a very strong baseline expectation of what behavior should be
like in real e¤ort versions of this game. Second, we will be able to use the context of the
public goods environment to maintain careful control of the cost function across contexts,
which we have already noted is vital to testing this issue. Third, one reason why real e¤ort
may lead to di¤erential behaviors, as noted in prior literature, is that individuals may feel
more attached to their earnings from the output of a real e¤ort game and the public goods
game provides an excellent vehicle to detect such di¤erences. If individuals feel more enti-
tled to their earnings in a real e¤ort context then it seems likely that they will react more
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harshly to group members that are contributing a lesser amount and therefore contributions
might be lower in a real e¤ort setting or they might decay faster. Further, the di¤erences
between trivial and useful e¤ort may be highlighted here as well as engaging in useful e¤ort
could be seen as already providing some sort of public good, which could lead to individuals
becoming more or less inclined towards cooperation.
Testing our question requires us to design an experiment in which we will vary the nature
of e¤ort provision across treatments between stylized, trivial and useful e¤ort. Doing this
requires us to design a public goods game that will have several novel elements compared
to standard public goods games and standard real e¤ort experiments. These elements are
necessary to ensure that the only thing that varies between treatments is how e¤ort is
elicited from the subjects. In the next section we provide a detailed explanation of our
experimental design, including an explanation regarding why each element is required.
2 Experiment Design
Our experiment is designed to determine if the nature of e¤ort will have a signicant impact
on observed behavior. This turns out to be a non-trivial issue to investigate as switching
from a standard stylized e¤ort design to a standard real e¤ort design involves changing a
number of important aspects of the environment other than the nature of the e¤ort itself,
many of which could a¤ect behavior. We will explain these issues as we explain some of the
key aspects of the design.
Our design is based on the standard model of a VCM used in many laboratory exper-
iments dating back to Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Isaac and Walker (1988).
As explained in Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011), this basic design has been used to
investigate many issues about public good provision and the base results have been repli-
cated many times. Our design will use as its base the exact same incentive structure as
these classic VCM designs and our treatments will involve varying how subjects receive the
tokens they will be investing in the VCM, while attempting to control all other factors.
The core of all of the treatments possess the same incentive structure. Participants are
randomly assigned to a group of 4 and remain matched for the duration of the experiment
session. In each period of the session, individual subjects have 10 tokens and can invest
these tokens into either an individual private account or a group account. For each token
invested in the individual account, the participant earns $0.20. For each token contributed
to the group account, the group earns $0.40. These group earnings are divided equally
between all 4 group members ($0.10 per group member), leading to a marginal per capital
return (MPCR) of 0.5. At the end of the period, participants are provided with feedback
that includes a reminder of their contributions to the individual account and group account,
the total number of tokens donated by all members of the group to the group account, and
a summary of their earnings for the period. This same process was repeated in every period
for a total of 10 periods.
In order to address our research question we had to implement these incentives with both
real and stylized e¤ort. A typical approach to a real e¤ort version of a public goods game
might have players solving math problems or other real e¤ort task and have the capability to
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generate earnings either for their group or just for themselves.2 One immediate di¤erence
between these designs and the standard VCM is that the production of the subjects in
the real e¤ort versions is unbounded. That would correspond to di¤erent subjects having
a di¤erent number of tokens to invest in a stylized e¤ort design and thus in addition to
the change in how e¤ort is modeled, these implementations also introduce heterogeneity
in investment capability. The issue of di¤erential ability or di¤erential endowment has
been investigated in the context of stylized e¤ort designs (e.g. Cherry, Krol, and Shogren
(2005); Buckley and Croson (2006); Reuben and Riedl (2013)) and not surprisingly these
alterations to the environment can impact the results. For our purposes, we have to design
our experiment to not introduce heterogeneity in this dimension.
Another di¤erence between real and stylized e¤ort experiments is the timing of the deci-
sions. In the standard VCM, a subject must make a single decision about token allocation,
i.e. choose how many tokens from 0-10 to contribute to the group account, and periods can
go very quickly. In a real e¤ort version, subjects have to spend time on the real e¤ort task
producing their tokens or their contributions to the accounts. The timing di¤erence could
lead to a person becoming more or perhaps less thoughtful over their contribution choices,
which could lead them to either be more or less cooperative. This element must also be
eliminated as a di¤erence between treatments.
Real e¤ort tasks may also di¤er from stylized e¤ort at a cognitive level as engaging in
the real e¤ort task will trigger additional cognitive processes that could distract a partic-
ipant from the underlying incentives of the VCM. While the directional impact of such a
distraction is unclear, it seems quite clear that contribution decisions could be impacted.
This means that comparisons of real e¤ort to a stylized e¤ort, where subjects only choose
contributions and are not also engaging in other cognitive tasks, will have another confound
which we seek to eliminate in our design.
We explain how our design dealt with these issues by describing each of the three treat-
ments, beginning with what we will refer to as the Useful E¤ort (UE) treatment. In the UE
treatment, subjects are engaged in a data entry task in which they enter actual nancial
data from Reuters. This data is an important component of a research project of another
faculty member at the university where the experiments were conducted (not a co-author
on this project). In the instructions we explain to the subjects very clearly that the data
entry task is vital to the research of this faculty member and exhort them to be careful in
their work.3 This was an attempt to have subjects truly see this as useful e¤ort and not
some abstract real e¤ort task necessary only for the experiment.
Subjects earned a token by entering in a ve-letter fund ticker, a two-letter fund code,
2For example, Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden (2001) had subjects solve two-variable optimization
problems while Cooper and Saral (2013) use GMAT questions. In the rst case, subjects were given two
problems, task A and task B to work on. E¤ort on task B was analogous to donations to the individual
account, while e¤ort on task A was (in some treatments) similar to the group account. In the second,
subjects were asked to donate their answers to GMAT questions to either the individual account or the
group account.
3We thought carefully about whether and how to error check the entries, but all ways we came up with
to do this caused other problems and confounds in the design. The possibility of errors in the data is a
problem for the researcher who will be using the data and the capability to enter random nonsense could
make the subjects take the task less seriously. Of course this is true of real data entry tasks as well so we
decided to settle on not error checking in real time.
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Figure 1: Sample of data subjects would enter in the Useful E¤ort treatment.
and the 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year percentage returns from a sheet printed out with this
information. An example of this data and how it is presented to subjects is shown in Figure
1. Each line of data would earn a single token and all subjects were required to enter
10 lines per period so that they would earn 10 tokens per period. They were not able to
earn more than 10 tokens per period and they could not advance to a new period without
earning all 10. This insured that all subjects had the exact same investment capability
in each period. It is also important that they did not earn their tokens and then make
their investment decision at the end. Subjects would make their investment choices while
generating the tokens using a toggle button on their screen. At the beginning of a period
they would have to switch the toggle to either the private or group account and then any
tokens they produced would go toward the selected account. They could switch the toggle
at any point during a period between the accounts which allowed them to create any split
they desired of the tokens between the two accounts. This means that they were essentially
choosing which account to work for while producing tokens.
We will refer to our next treatment as the Trivial E¤ort (TE) treatment and it is
conducted identically in all aspects to the previously described UE treatment except that
the data subjects enter is presented to them with no context. Subjects in the TE treatment
were handed identical data sheets to those in the UE treatment but there was no mention
that the data would be used for any external purpose. They were only told that the reason
to enter the data is to earn the tokens. To accomplish this, two copies of each data sheet
were printed where one went to someone in the TE treatment and one went to someone in
the UE treatment.
Designing a treatment to represent Stylized E¤ort (SE) which has the properties of a
standard VCM but that di¤ers from the previous two treatments only by how the tokens
are earned required us to design this treatment to be substantially di¤erent from a standard
VCM. In this treatment, subjects receive tokens without requiring any e¤ort on their part
and so there is no data entry task. In order to ensure that the timing issues were the same
between this treatment and the others, subjects would still make their investment choices
using the same toggle switch as in the other treatments but instead of earning the tokens
through e¤ort, the tokens would arrive at random intervals. The token arrival times were
drawn at random from the actual distribution of subject times to complete a data entry line
from the UE and TE sessions. The average length of time between tokens was 22 seconds,
with a maximum of 73 seconds and a minimum of 8. Subjects would receive a warning
that a token was going to be deposited into the selected account 3 seconds before it was to
allow them to change the current account to which tokens were accruing if they wanted to.
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These design choices were made to ensure the timing and the nature of the decisions were
the same across all three treatments. In order to give those in the SE treatment something
to do while the tokens appeared that could stimulate some sort of cognitive processes, we
allowed them to play Tic-Tac-Toe against a computer opponent for no earnings. We made
it very clear that playing this game was not connected to earning tokens and that there
were no earnings related to playing. Subjects could however have been just as distracted
by playing this task as engaging in the data entry tasks causing them to be distracted from
the VCM incentives.4
The design of this experiment ensures that the costs of decisions are equivalent between
treatments as the cost of working to generate a token to the group account is the earn-
ings/utility given up that could have been generated by working to generate a token to the
individual account and vice versa. One might argue that the real e¤ort tokens are more
expensive to acquire than the stylized e¤ort tokens but that extra expense has no impact on
the decision making margins for contributions as they wash out of the comparison. Further,
the main component of cost in an experiment like this is probably the time cost of how
long it takes to generate a token and this was common across all treatments. It is in this
way that we have ensured costs are common between treatments. What our design does
not do is guarantee equivalent utility functions across treatments. As we discussed above,
the most compelling argument for why real e¤ort might generate di¤erent behavior than
stylized e¤ort is the possibility that earning the tokens through real e¤ort could impact
the utility functions the subjects have and in this case that would appear through their
willingness to be cooperative and such depending on how the tokens are earned. Thus it is
through this possible channel that one might expect di¤erences in behavior to emerge.
We conducted 2 sessions of all treatments. Groups of 4 were randomly formed at the start
of each session and these groups remained constant throughout the session. All subjects
were students at Ohio University and the experiment was programmed using Z-tree software,
Fischbacher (2007). Table 1 provides information on the average earnings and the number
of subjects who participated in each treatment.
Useful E¤ort Trivial E¤ort Stylized E¤ort
Average Earnings (USD) $30.37 $31.84 $30.91
Number of Subjects 28 32 28
Table 1: Earnings and number of subjects by treatment.
3 Results
We begin the analysis of the results with a rst look at the data in Figure 2 which shows
average investment levels into the group account by period for all three treatments. Since
our SE treatment is substantially di¤erent than a more traditional stylized e¤ort VCM we
also include data in the gure from two prior studies which use the more traditional design,
Croson (2001) and Houser and Kurzban (2002), and have the same parameterization as
466% of subjects played at least one game of tic-tac-toe. The average number of games played in a period
was 11.
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Figure 2: Average the group account by period over all 10 rounds.
our design (MPCR = 0.5, n = 4, 10 periods, partner matching). The gure shows that the
results from all three of our treatments are very similar to each other and that all three show
the standard pattern observed in other VCM experiments, i.e. contributions starting at a
moderately high level and then decaying over time. Despite the design of our experiments
being very di¤erent, it is also interesting to see that our data fall right in-line with the results
observed in the more traditional stylized e¤ort designs from Croson (2001) and Houser and
Kurzban (2002). We also provide Table 2 which contains the values from only our data of
the average contributions to the group account and their standard deviation for selected
rounds.5 The table provides additional evidence of the similarity between treatments - not
only are the average levels of contributions similar between treatments but so too are the
standard errors.
Given that contributions are not independent over time, we cannot test any formal
hypotheses on these averages as any such test would be incorrectly specied. We instead
provide several di¤erent regression approaches for dealing with the interactions between
group members and over time in Table 3. The regressions are random e¤ects panel regres-
sions where the dependent variable is the amount contributed to the group account. To
account for the repeated observations across subjects, errors are clustered at the subject
level. Observations are also not entirely independent across group members and so one
might also want to cluster at the group level. The data contains only 22 groups which
5We provide the same data for all rounds in the appendix.
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Treatment Period 1 Period 5 Period 10 Overall
SE 6:21
(2:83)
6:61
(3:50)
2:64
(3:46)
5:45
(3:73)
TE 6:25
(2:71)
6:38
(2:93)
3:25
(3:38)
5:92
(3:41)
UE 5:92
(3:52)
5:86
(3:58)
3:11
(3:34)
5:19
(3:62)
All Treatments 6:14
(3:00)
6:14
(3:32)
3:01
(3:36)
5:54
(3:59)
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations of contributions to the group account by treatment.
means that clustering at the group level may not satisfy the asymptotic properties of the
estimator. As such, we dont choose this as our default specication but we do provide the
results for specications using the Bias-Reducing Linearization (BRL) procedure (McCaf-
frey and Bell (2002)) to cluster at the group level which corrects for the small number of
clusters. The qualitative results are unchanged by this alternative specication. One might
also be concerned about the potential for a censoring problem with the data since subjects
could not contribute more than 10 (25% of token allocation decisions to the group were at
the maximum of 10) or less than 0 (18% of token allocation decisions to the group were at
the minimum of 0, which is the dominant strategy prediction). We therefore also include
the results of a Tobit estimator with errors clustered at the subject level in the appendix
and again, the qualitative results are unchanged.
Result 1 There are no statistically signicant di¤erences in contributions between treat-
ments.
Each of the regression specications include dummy variables for the TE and UE treat-
ments. These coe¢ cients allow us to test whether the average contributions are di¤erent
between treatments. The rst specication includes only these dummy variables, and a
constant, which provides a clean test for di¤erences between the overall contribution levels.
Neither coe¢ cient is signicant which indicates that the contributions to the group account
in TE and UE are not signicantly di¤erent from SE. Since the two coe¢ cients are opposite
signs, it could be the case that the average level of contributions to the group account in
TE and UE are di¤erent. A post-estimation Wald test yields a p value of 0:24 indicating
that those two coe¢ cients are also not signicantly di¤erent from each other.
We also test whether there are di¤erences over time. Figure 2 indicated that the time
paths look similar, but to test this observation formally the second specication in Table 3
includes a time trend and interactions between that time trend and the treatments. This
yields the second result.
Result 2 There are no statistically signicant di¤erences between treatments in how con-
tributions adjust across time.
In this specication, the Period variable is negative and signicant indicating that, as
in most other similar VCM data, there is a decay in contributions over time in the SE
treatment. The interactions between Period and the two other treatments are insignicant
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(1) (2) (3)
TE 0.465 -0.175 -0.321
(0.602) (0.825) (0.865)
UE -0.268 -0.712 -0.497
(0.692) (0.973) (1.018)
Period -0.423
(0.089)
PeriodTE 0.116
(0.112)
PeriodUE 0.081
(0.117)
Groupt 1 0.522
(0.121)
Groupt 1TE 0.096
(0.149)
Groupt 1UE 0.076
(0.198)
Constant 5.454 7.781 2.355
(0.474) (0.692) (0.638)
Obs (Groups) 880 (88) 880 (88) 792 (88)
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Random e¤ects panel regressions concerning the investments into the Group ac-
count.
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and of the same sign indicating that the rate of decay is not di¤erent for any of our treat-
ments. Post-estimation Wald tests conrm no di¤erence in the decay (the interaction terms,
p = 0:72) or the treatments after accounting for the decay (the binary variables for the UE
and TE treatments, p = 0:51) for the two real-e¤ort treatments.6
The last regression specication examines how individuals respond to the average level of
investment by their group members from the previous period. Many prior studies conclude
that subjects often engage in conditional cooperation in VCMs; they are willing to cooperate
if others also cooperate but contributions will decline if they do not see others contributing
at their expected level. Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) demonstrate that this behavior can
yield the standard decay pattern we observe over time. This specication includes a lag
of the average contribution by an individuals group members (Groupt 1) to determine
if we can see any di¤erences between treatments regarding how individuals react to the
contribution levels of others.7 This leads to our third result.
Result 3 There are no statistically signicant di¤erences between treatments in how con-
tributions adjust to contributions by group members.
Consistent with conditional cooperation behavior, the signicance of the lagged variable
indicates that subjects do adjust their contributions based on the contributions of others.
The interaction terms, however, are all insignicant which again conrms that there are
no di¤erences between treatments in regard to how individuals react to the contributions
of others. Post-estimation Walt tests support the lack of a di¤erence between the TE and
UE coe¢ cients (p = 0:86) or the interaction e¤ect (p = 0:91) between the two real-e¤ort
treatments.
4 Conclusion
Our goal was to determine if the manner in which e¤ort is simulated in a lab experiment
has signicant behavioral e¤ects. There are many claims in the literature that making the
e¤ort task seem more eld-like should enhance the external validity of the results, making
them more credible. For that to be true, it should be the case that making the e¤ort
more eld-like should also have some direct impact on behavior. While the claim regarding
external validity has been asserted many times in the literature, there is little in the way of
empirical evidence to support it. Our results certainly do not provide such evidence.
We nd that all three ways we model e¤ort provision in the lab, stylized, trivial and
useful e¤ort, yield identical outcomes. Not only do we nd the standard comparative static
results common to all VCM experiments across treatments, i.e. initially moderate to high
contributions to the public account which decline over time, but the levels of contributions
across all three e¤ort designs are indistinguishable from each other. Given these results, it
seems di¢ cult to advance a claim that the outcome of an experiment designed on the basis
6We do not include the results here, but Result 2 is robust to period by period regressions to determine
if we could nd di¤erences in any single period. We nd no di¤erences between treatments even in period
by period regressions.
7Because of the near perfect (negative) correlation between the lagged term and Period (p < 0:0001), the
regression from column two cannot include both Period and Groupt 1.
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of any of the three e¤ort models should be considered as inherently more or less externally
valid or eld relevant than any of the others.
We should of course be careful about how our results are interpreted. Our results do not
suggest that we should expect any real e¤ort experiment and any stylized e¤ort experiment
to yield identical results. There are typically many di¤erences between real and stylized
e¤ort designs other than the nature of how e¤ort is modeled which can impact the behavior.
Most importantly, the underlying cost function can di¤er substantially between real and
stylized e¤ort designs with the cost function in the real e¤ort design generally unknown and
sometimes unknowable. There are also several other potential confounds in comparisons
of real e¤ort to stylized e¤ort that our experiment was designed to eliminate, such as the
di¤erences in timing of choices and the degree to which subjects were distracted by other
tasks. What our results strongly suggest is that should someone observe a di¤erence in
behavior between a real e¤ort and stylized e¤ort environment that it is not the nature of
the e¤ort itself which is driving the di¤erences but rather it is these others di¤erences, such
as di¤erential cost functions, which are driving the behavioral di¤erences.
These results should also be helpful to understand when real e¤ort and stylized e¤ort
models might best be used. First, one should not decide between them on the false assump-
tion that one is necessarily more eld relevant than the other. A more reasonable basis for
selecting between designs has to do with issues concerning the nature of the cost function in
the real e¤ort design and the research question being addressed. If there are elements of the
cost function for the real e¤ort task which cannot be replicated in an induced cost function
yet are important to the issues being tested, then it certainly makes sense to use a real
e¤ort design. This might involve situations in which an experimenter is trying to estimate
some properties of the cost function or if there are some sort of demographic di¤erences in
cost functions of a certain type that are a key interest in the research question. In the latter
case, one has to be very careful about the real e¤ort task selected as di¤erent ones will have
di¤erent properties and generate di¤erent demographic interactions. The real e¤ort task
must be therefore chosen due to it possessing properties very similar to the eld situation
of interest and it must also be made clear the domains to which those results do and do not
apply. On the other hand, should one of these specic issues not be a core element in the
research question of the study, there does not seem to be a compelling argument to use a
real e¤ort design due to the substantial control lost in doing so.
A valid question regarding our results is the degree to which they might transfer to other
games. The trust game might be an important one to consider as it di¤ers in important
ways from this public goods model. Games like this add in another dimension that we might
refer to as real versus stylized consequences. In a real e¤ort trust game, one might think
to implement it by paying subjects di¤erent at wages to engage in a task (e.g. stu¢ ng
envelopes) to determine if they respond to high level gift wages with higher e¤ort. In
this case it may well matter substantially what entity is receiving the benets of the labor
because in addition to the subjects possessing some unknown cost for completing the task
they also may receive utility due to some unknown utility function for completing the task
on behalf of that entity. One could refer to the situation in which the benet of the labor
accrues to some actual entity as one with real consequences. It would certainly be possible
to conduct an experiment in which those consequences are modeled in a stylized manner by
inducing utility from the benets of the labor by paying the subjects money based on the
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labor and again, to the extent that the induced utility function matches the homegrown one
then similar results should be expected. Which approach one uses here depends on what you
want to test. If you want to examine the nature of these unknown utility functions then you
would want to use a real consequences design. If, however, you wanted to understand how
subjects respond to di¤erent versions of those consequences you could conduct the stylized
consequences design. While a very di¤erent context, an example of both approaches is shown
in Isaac, Pevnitskaya, and Salmon (2010) in which the authors investigate charity auctions
in which the preferences for the charities are induced in a stylized manner to determine how
well the behavior matches with the theoretical predictions and then in other treatments
the preferences are induced by having the revenue go to an actual charity to determine
if behavior changes in some way based on the homegrown utility functions. The relevant
issues here turn out to be very similar to the issues weve investigated above regarding real
versus stylized e¤ort and, in our view, the same design principles should translate between
contexts.
The results from this study do not provide the answers to all relevant questions regarding
where, when, and why someone should use a real or stylized e¤ort design in an experiment
but we believe that these results do help to place the relevant questions into proper per-
spective and help to provide some guidance on important aspects of the question. As with
all elements of an experimental design, one must pay careful attention to how the specic
design choices one makes a¤ect the results and thought must be given to how reective
those design choices are of the situation to which you wish to apply the results. Our view
is that both stylized e¤ort and real e¤ort designs can and should be used with the nature
of the underlying research question determining which is preferred. Also, both approaches
should be considered to have equal external validity and generalizability though of course
careful attention must always be paid to how broadly one attempts to generalize the results
of any data driven exercise.
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5 Experiment Instructions
5.0.1 Verbal Script
Items in Bold represent the instructions presented on a single screen. The <> represents
the beginning and end of di¤erent instructions given in the di¤erent treatments. Items in
italics were not on the subjects screen, but were read outloud.
Welcome.
This experiment is a study of group and individual exchange behavior. The instructions
are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good investment decisions, you may
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
Please wait while I start the system.
Please follow along carefully on your screen as we go through the instructions.
<Trivial Real E¤ort>
General Information:
You are one person in a group of 4.
Each of you will complete a task to earn a set of 10 tokens per round. The task is similar
to data entry. We will provide you with printouts of the data and we would like you to
enter it into the computer.
All 10 tokens that you earn will be invested to turn them into income.
There are two ways you can earn money by investing your tokens.
Please press continue to nd out more about these two ways of investing your tokens.
</end Trivial Real E¤ort>
<Useful Real E¤ort>
General Information:
You are one person in a group of 4.
Each of you will work to earn a set of 10 tokens per round. The task you will be engaged
in is entering data on mutual fund investments. We will provide you printouts of the data
and we would like you to enter it into the computer so that we can create an electronic data
le with this information. This data is required by another researcher who will be using the
data entered here for a research project on nancial markets. Since this data will be used
in a research project it is important that it be entered in accurately and completely.
All 10 tokens that you earn will be invested to turn them into income.
There are two ways you can earn money by investing your tokens.
Please press continue to nd out more about these two ways of investing your tokens.
</end Useful Real E¤ort>
<Stylized>
General Information:
You are one person in a group of 4.
Each of you will be given a set of 10 tokens per round.
All 10 tokens that you receive will be invested to turn them into income.
There are two ways you can earn money by investing your tokens.
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Please press continue to nd out more about these two ways of investing your tokens.
</end Stylized>
The rst way you have to invest is the Individual account, which you can see described
on this screen.
The Individual Account:
For every token you invest in the individual account, you will receive $0.20.
For example, if you invest 4 tokens in the individual account you will earn $0.80 (4x$0.20)
If you invest all 10 tokens in the individual account, you earn $2.00.
Please press continue to learn about the second option you have for investing your
tokens.
The second way you have to invest is the group account.
The Group Account:
The return on your investment in the group account is not so easily determined.
Your earnings depend upon the total investment in the group account (your invested
tokens plus all of the other tokens invested by the other people in your group.)
Please click on the Continue button to nd out more about the group account.
The Rules of the Group Account:
You and 3 other people are members of a group. In your group, you and all other
members have (earned) 10 tokens.
Every token invested by a group member in the group account generates $0.40 to the
group and all group earnings are split equally.
This means that you and the other group members earn $0.10 for every token invested
into the group account. It does not matter who invests the tokens in the group account.
All earnings are divided equally between all members.
The more the group invests, the more all group members earn from the group account.
Please press continue to see an example.
Group Account Example:
If you put no tokens in the group account, but the other members invested enough to
earn $2.00, you would earn $0.50 from the group account.
If the others invest no tokens in the group account, but you put in enough for the group
to earn $2.00, you still earn $0.50 from the group account.
Remember how much you and the other group members earn depends on how much
all of you together put into the group account.
You have been given a handout with a payo¤ table outlining how tokens invested in the
group account translate to earnings. Please turn to this handout now as we go through
example 1.
Example 1:
Suppose that the members of your group together invest a total of 24 tokens in the group
account. From the table, individual and group payment corresponds to the row where 24
tokens are contributed. You will see from the table that the group earns $9.60 and each
group member earns their equal share of this amount, $2.40.
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Notice that you would receive $2.40 from the group account whether or not you invested
any of your tokens into the group account.
Now that we have discussed both investment options for your 10 tokens, please press
continue to learn about the interface you will be using for the duration of the experiment.
<UE and TE>
At the bottom of the screen you will see two containers, which represent the two ac-
counts, individual and group, that you can invest your tokens into. To select an account to
invest in, you must click on the container. To see how this works, please select the individual
account by clicking on the yellow container. You will see that the group account container
is now grey which indicates your only active account is the individual account. You will see
a reminder of the $0.20 payo¤ for each token invested in the individual account to the left
of the individual account container.
At the top of the screen you will see the area where you will input your data. You have
been given a sheet of paper with the data to be input. For now, please see the handout
with Practice Workwritten at the top. In the appropriate sections, please carefully type
the data from the sheet into the boxes provided for the specied categories.
<UE only>
Please remember that the data you are inputting is required by another researcher who
will be using the data you input for a research project on nancial markets. Since this data
will be used in a research project it is VERY important that it be entered in accurately and
completely.
</end UE only>
You only need to type in the rst line of data. Once you have nished this, submit your
work by pressing the submit button. This will generate a token, which will be automatically
invested in the active account, which is currently the individual account. The containers
will update automatically with the number invested. Please input the data and submit your
work to see how this works.
Please click on the group account container now. You will see that it has highlighted
orange and the individual account is now gray. This indicates that the group account is
now active and any tokens will be invested in this account. You will see a reminder of the
$0.40 payo¤ to the group for each token invested in the group account to the right of the
group account container. Please type in the second line of data and then click on the submit
button.
You will work to earn 10 total tokens in a round. Each data line will generate one token,
which you will choose how to invest. You will see how many tokens are remaining to be
earned and invested which is labeled investments left to make.
Please press continue to see a sample of a results screen for a round.
</end UE and TE>
<SE>
Tokens will arrive at certain intervals. How these tokens are invested depends upon
which account you currently have activated. At the bottom of the screen you will see two
containers, which represent the two accounts, individual and group, that you can invest
your tokens into. To activate an account to invest in, you must click on the container. To
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see how this works, please select the individual account by clicking on the yellow container.
You will see that the group account container is now grey which indicates your only active
account is the individual account. You will see a reminder of the $0.20 payo¤ for each token
invested in the individual account to the left of the individual account container.
At the top of the screen you will see a tic-tac-toe board on the top right and on the
top left, at some point, you should see or have seen a green token appear. This will be au-
tomatically invested in the active account, which is currently the individual account. You
can change the active account at anytime by clicking on the other container. Tokens will
appear at random intervals though you will be warned 3 seconds before they are automat-
ically invested in case you want to redirect it to a di¤erent account. The containers will
update automatically with the number or tokens invested in each.
Please click on the group account container now. You will see that it has highlighted
orange and the individual account is now gray. This indicates that the group account is
now active and any tokens will be invested in this account. You will see a reminder of the
$0.40 payo¤ to the group for each token invested in the group account to the right of the
group account container.
You will be given 10 total tokens in a round, which you will choose how to invest by
clicking on the respective containers. You will see how many remaining tokens are coming
in red above the containers investments left to make.
Tic-tac-toe is provided for you to play if you wish to while you are waiting on tokens.
You will be playing against a computerized opponent and there is no payment for winning
or losing a tic-tac-toe game.
Please press continue to see a sample of a results screen for a round.
</end SE >
You will now see a sample results screen. Recall that you will have 10 tokens in a round.
Assume for this example you had invested 5 of these tokens to the individual account and
5 to the group account. Assume also that the other members of your group had invested a
total of 16 tokens to the group account, so the total amount of tokens in the group account
is 21.
At the top you will nd your individual earnings, which for 5 tokens invested would be
equal to $1.00.
Below this you will nd a reminder of your contribution to the group account, which for
this example was 5, and below this the sum of all contribution by all members (including
you) to the group account. In this example, the total number of tokens contributed by all
members of the group is 21, meaning the group earned a total of $8.40. Your share of the
group earnings would be $2.10.
Your total earnings for the round would be equal to your individual earnings of $1.00
plus your share of the group earnings, $2.10, for total earnings of $3.10.
Please note that this was an example to demonstrate round results and is not suggestive
of how much you will actually make in each round.
Please press continue for some nal information before we begin the paid portion of this
experiment.
Final Information:
You will have 10 rounds in which you will make investment decision about your 10
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tokens. The prots you make are stored by the computer after each round and the total
prots from all rounds will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
After you and everyone else in your group has had a chance to invest all 10 tokens in a
round, you will be shown a results screen which will inform you of how many tokens were
invested in the group account and how many you have put into your individual account.
You will also been shown your own earnings from the group account and from the individual
account, and your total earnings for the round.
You group will remain the same for the duration of the experiment.
We are about to begin the experiment. If you have a decision to make, please make it
and click on the appropriate buttons so that the experiment will progress. Everything is
now self-paced. Please press continue.
We are about to begin the paid rounds. Before each round, you will see a screen like this
to initiate your investment account. Once you select the initial investment account (and
remember, this can be changed at anytime) you will be directed to the next screen where
you will have 10 tokens to invest.
Please make your selection and begin.
5.0.2 Subject Handouts
Stylized E¤ort Cheat Sheet handed out along with payo¤ table
22
Trivial E¤ort Cheat Sheet handed out along with payo¤ table
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Useful E¤ort Cheat Sheet handed out along with payo¤ table
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Payo¤ Table
6 Appendix
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BRL1 Tobit1 BRL2 Tobit2 BRL3 Tobit3
TE 0.465 0.690 -0.175 -0.334 -0.908
(0.932) (1.035) (0.802) (1.449) (1.350) (1.874)
UE -0.268 -0.427 -0.712 -1.050 -0.690 -1.124
(1.058) (1.192) (0.800) (1.701) (1.649) (2.040)
Period -0.423 -0.686
(0.111) (0.170)
PeriodTE 0.116 0.190
(0.155) (0.199)
PeriodUE 0.0807 0.120
(0.148) (0.213)
Groupt 1 0.178 0.324
(0.064) (0.076)
Groupt 1TE 0.063 0.064
(0.069) (0.097)
Groupt 1Useful 0.038 0.080
(0.103) (0.121)
Constant 5.454 5.733 7.781 9.461 2.285 -0.0914
(0.674) (0.808) (0.354) (1.241) (1.284) (1.533)
Obs (Groups) 880 (22) 880 (88) 880 (22) 880 (88) 792 (22) 792 (88)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
BRLX: Biased-Reduced Linearization clustering at the group level to correct for the small number of clusters.
TobitX: Tobit with bounds [0,10] with standard errors are clustered at the subject level..
Trt Pd 1 Pd 2 Pd 3 Pd 4 Pd 5 Pd 6 Pd 7 Pd 8 Pd 9 Pd 10 Overall
SE 6:21
(2:83)
6:96
(2:87)
6:96
(3:20)
5:86
(3:95)
6:61
(3:50)
5:75
(3:84)
5:21
(3:90)
4:79
(3:97)
3:54
(3:45)
2:64
(3:47)
5:45
(3:73)
TE 6:25
(2:71)
7:31
(2:79)
7:06
(3:23)
6:13
(3:47)
6:38
(2:93)
6:09
(3:41)
5:78
(3:63)
6:19
(3:19)
4:75
(3:79)
3:25
(3:37)
5:92
(3:41)
UE 5:92
(3:52)
6:64
(3:42)
6:68
(3:40)
5:86
(3:58)
5:39
(3:55)
4:64
(3:61)
4:50
(3:38)
5:07
(3:44)
4:04
(3:85)
3:11
(3:34)
5:19
(3:62)
All 6:14
(3:00)
6:99
(3:01)
6:91
(3:24)
5:95
(3:62)
6:14
(3:32)
5:52
(3:63)
5:19
(3:64)
5:39
(3:54)
4:14
(3:70)
3:01
(3:36)
5:54
(3:59)
Means and standard deviations of contributions to the Group account by period.
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